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Abstract
The school choice problem concerns the design and imple-
mentation of matching mechanisms that produce school as-
signments for students within a given public school district. In
this note we define a simple student-optimal criterion that is
not met by any previously employed mechanism in the school
choice literature. We then use this criterion to adapt a well-
known combinatorial optimization technique (Hungarian al-
gorithm) to the school choice problem.
1 Introduction
School choice policies are processes by which families have
some say in determining where their children go to school.
Since the late eighties such policies have been adopted
by many school districts across the nation. Before school
choice, students were typically assigned to public schools
according to proximity. Since wealthy families have the
means to move to areas with desirable or reputable schools,
such families have always had de facto school choice. Chil-
dren in families that could not afford such a privilege were
left with no other option than to attend the closest school -
whether or not the school was desirable and/or was a good
fit. Thus school choice has been celebrated as a successful
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tool giving more families the power to shape their children’s
education, regardless of socioeconomic background.
In many school districts where funding and experienced
teachers are lacking, school quality is uneven and often a
small number of schools are strongly preferred over oth-
ers. Since it is not possible to assign all students to their
top choice school, the question of how to assign students
to schools is often regarded as the central issue in school
choice. In order to safeguard parents who seek to have their
children attend schools conveniently within walking dis-
tance, at which a sibling is enrolled, or those offering need-
based programs, districts define and adhere to a handful of
school priorities which encapsulate such constraints. Thus
school choice can be viewed as a two-sided matching prob-
lem. An extensive study of two-sided matching problems
can be found in (Roth and Sotomayor 1990); a more recent
historical overview is (Roth 2008).
Previous work on school choice as a matching prob-
lem evaluates assignments using the notions of stability,
Pareto efficiency and strategyproofness. Though all wor-
thy considerations, these do not necessarily suffice to pro-
mote the most desirable outcomes. In the context of school
choice, stability corresponds to preventing priority viola-
tions. A priority violation occurs when a student desires a
school more than the school to which she was assigned,
and has higher priority than a student assigned to her de-
sired school. Preventing priority violations is desirable for
a very pragmatic reason: Students whose priorities are vi-
olated may have legitimate grounds for legal action. Even
without legal recourse, it is often felt that students are
“entitled” to schools in which they have been prioritized.
However the focus on avoiding priority violations in cur-
rent school choice mechanisms leads to documented in-
efficiencies. See (Abdulkadirogˇlu, Pathak, and Roth 2009),
(Erdil and Ergin 2008), (Kesten 2010), (Roth 1982) for
more on this potential tradeoff between stability and effi-
ciency.
In this note, we propose an approach to the school choice
problem which focuses on student preferences rather than
school priorities.
Our preference index naturally associates a “cost” to each
matching and as a result we conceptualize the school choice
problem as a “cost minimizing” assignment problem. In this
context, a lower cost assignment corresponds to a matching
that in some sense more closely meets student preferences.
We can then introduce a new mechanism, adapted from a
well-known combinatorial optimization algorithm, that pro-
duces a matching minimizing this cost, i.e., meeting student
preferences as closely as possible. With respect to our in-
dex, the assignments produced by this mechanism often out-
perform the outcomes of standard mechanisms used or pro-
posed in recent literature. Furthermore our method may be
modified to respect and utilize student preference compat-
ibilities. In cities without well-defined or legally required
priorities (e.g. those that use whole-city lotteries), our ap-
proach provides policy makers two possible ways to create
the most optimal student matching. Even cities committed
to respecting student priorities may find these ideas valuable
as priorities may indeed be incorporated at an intermediate
or a final stage, see the relevant discussion in §4.
Research background
School district policy decisions have long provided active
lines of inquiry for public policy designers, operations
researchers, economists and education administrators.
Much of the relevant work has focused on designing
school district boundaries in order to optimize various
measures. For a diverse yet representative selection
of work in this vein, see (Brown and Knight 2005),
(Caro et al. 2004), (Ferland and Guenett 1990),
(Franklin and Koenigsber 1973).
In our work we focus on assignment policy as a mech-
anism design problem, which provides a natural frame-
work to investigate means of implementing social goals
(cf. (Maskin 2008)). In the following we will refer to three
specific mechanisms. The first two were introduced in
(Abdulkadirogˇlu and So¨nmez 2003) while the third was pre-
sented in (Kesten 2010).
1. Student-Optimal Stable Matching Mechanism (SOSM)
2. Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTC)
3. Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
(EADAM)
SOSM adapts the famous Gale-Shapley Deferred
Acceptance (DA) algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962)
to the school choice problem. It is well established
as a stable and strategyproof mechanism that has al-
ready been implemented in several large urban school
districts (Abdulkadirogˇlu, Pathak, and Roth 2009),
(Abdulkadirogˇlu et al. 2006). However, when applied
to large-scale data SOSM may lead to some welfare losses
(Kesten 2010). TTC is an alternative mechanism which
promotes efficiency as opposed to stability, and is also
strategyproof. The basic algorithm is to create trading cy-
cles alternating between students and schools and to allow
efficient matchings. EADAM is proposed in (Kesten 2010)
as a way to alleviate some of the efficiency costs of stability
by iteratively running SOSM and modifying the preferences
of any interrupters (who are students who cause others to
be rejected from a school which later on rejects them) such
that the SOSM outcome is Pareto dominated. As any Pareto
domination of SOSM will lead to priority violations (cf.
(Gale and Shapley 1962)), EADAM leads to at least one
priority violation. We will not need the specific processes in
our work.
Recent literature also examines various
real-life mechanisms such as those from
Boston (Abdulkadirogˇlu et al. 2005), Chicago
(Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006), Milwaukee
(Greene, Peterson, and Du 1999), (Rouse 1998), and
New York City (Abdulkadirogˇlu, Pathak, and Roth 2005).
Notation, basic terms and our model
Let I denote a nonempty set of students, and S a nonempty
set of schools. A matching M : I → I × S is a function
that associates every student with exactly one school, or po-
tentially no school at all. Write M for the set of matchings.
We write Mi = s if M(i) = (i, s). For all s ∈ S, we let qs
denote the capacity of s.
A preference profile for a student i ∈ I , written Pi, is a
tuple (S1, . . . , Sn) where the Sj’s form a partition of S and
every element of Sj is preferred to every element of Sk if
and only if j < k. Define the ranking function ϕi : S → Z
of a student i ∈ I by letting ϕi(s) denote i’s ranking of
s ∈ S. In other words ϕi(s) = j if s ∈ Sj . When each Sj
is singleton, we say that i’s preference profile is strict, (in
which case we can view Pi as an n-vector). If sk, sl ∈ Sj
for some j, k 6= l, then we say that the student is indif-
ferent between sk and sl. If i prefers sk to sl, we write
sk ≻i sl, or simply sk ≻ sl if i is unambiguous. We de-
note a set consisting of preference profiles for each student
in I by P = {Pi : i ∈ I} and the space of all such sets is
denoted by P.
A priority structure for a school s ∈ S, written Πs, is
a tuple (I1, . . . , In) where the Ij ’s form a partition of I and
every element of Ij is preferred to every element of Ik if
and only if j < k. When each Ij is singleton, we say that
s’s priority structure is strict, (in which case we can view
Πs as an n-vector). If ik, il ∈ Ij for some j, k 6= l, then
we say that the school is indifferent between ik and il. If
s prefers ik to il we write ik ≻s il, or simply ik ≻ il if s
is unambiguous from context. We denote a set consisting of
priority structures for each school in S by Π = {Πs : s ∈
S} and the space of all such sets is denoted by .
A matching M ′ (Pareto) dominates M if M ′i ≻i Mi for
all i and M ′j ≻j Mj is strict for some j. A (Pareto) efficient
matching is a matching that is not (Pareto) dominated.
A matching mechanism M : P ×  → M is a function
that takes an ordered pair (P,Π) ∈ P×  of preferences and
priorities and produces a matching.
Let Πs be a priority structure for school s. We say that
a matching M violates the priority of i ∈ I for s if there
exist some j ∈ I and s′ ∈ S such that
1. Mj = s, Mi = s′: j gets assigned s under M and i gets
assigned s′ under M .
2. s ≻i s′: i prefers attending s over s′; and
3. i ≻s j: s prioritizes i over j.
We say that a matching M is stable if
1. M does not violate any priorities.
2. No student is matched to a lower-ranked school when a
more preferred school is unfilled.
A stable mechanism is a mechanism that always produces
stable matchings. A mechanism is strategyproof if no stu-
dent can ever receive a more preferred school by submitting
falsified, as opposed to truthful, preferences.
In the above context, the goal of the school choice prob-
lem is to find a matching mechanismM which satisfies cer-
tain criteria.
2 A Natural criterion for evaluating
assignment mechanisms
The current literature on school choice proposes mecha-
nisms that balance student preferences and school priori-
ties by using stability, (Pareto) efficiency, and strategyproof-
ness as the standard criteria for evaluating the desirability
of a given mechanism. In our work, we emphasize student
preferences. With this spirit, we introduce a new student-
optimal criterion to expand the scope of what constitutes a
good mechanism.
The question of what criteria to use to judge the qual-
ity or desirability of a mechanism is a difficult one; for ex-
ample, see (Mcfadden 2009) where McFadden argues that
tolerance of behavioral faults should be included in such a
list of criteria. The goal of school districts when designing a
school choice policy is not singular (unlike, for instance, the
case of auction design where our sole objective is to max-
imize selling price). Thus, it is especially important for us
to define a yardstick by which we measure the success of
a given school choice mechanism. We could technically de-
fine the best school mechanism as one that minimizes the
government education funding budgets, produces the most
elite students, or improves the conditions of less-advantaged
students the most, etc. Obviously, the ultimate design de-
pends on how we define the objective/criteria of the school
choice problem.
In this section we propose a simple criterion which pro-
vides a possible interpretation of how to best honor student
preferences. Our index inherently captures the utilitarian ob-
jective of improving the outcome for as many students as
possible.
A preference reverence index
We begin with an example from (Roth 1982) which illus-
trates the possible tradeoff between stability and efficiency
mentioned in §1. Assume there are three schools, s1, s2, s3
and three students i1, i2, i3. The priorities of the schools and
the preferences of the students are given by:
s1 : i1 ≻ i3 ≻ i2 i1 : s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
s2 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3 i2 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
s3 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3 i3 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
Here, the only stable matching is:(
i1 i2 i3
s1 s2 s3
)
.
But this matching is (Pareto) dominated by:(
i1 i2 i3
s2 s1 s3
)
.
We see that the second matching (Pareto) dominates the first
matching because it gives i1 and i2 schools they preferred
over their stable matching. However, this (Pareto) efficient
matching is not stable because i2 now violates i3’s priority
in s1.
Now, we construct a “preference reverence index” that,
on the students’ side, would quantify how much their prefer-
ences were dismissed, and a “priority reverence index” that,
on the schools’ side, would quantify how much their prior-
ities were dismissed. We assign numbers to the preferences
and priorities of schools. Namely, we assign a 0 to a stu-
dent’s first choice, a 1 to their second choice, and so on. For
the stable matching we have:
Schools: 0 + 0 + 2 = 2 (priority reverence index)
Students: 1+ 1+ 2 = 4 (preference reverence index)
And, for the (Pareto) efficient matching we have:
Schools: 1 + 2 + 2 = 5 (priority reverence index)
Students: 0 + 0 + 2 = 2 (preference reverence index)
We see that the (Pareto) efficient matching has better
served the student preferences (lower preference reverence
index) at the expense of the school priorities (higher priority
reverence index). In fact, by the definition of (Pareto) effi-
ciency, all (Pareto) dominations of stable matchings under
SOSM improve how well student preferences are honored,
thereby lowering the preference index.
Let us make the above precise.
Let I be a nonempty set of students, and S be a nonempty
set of m schools. Recall that for any i ∈ I , s ∈ S, ϕi(s)
is i’s ranking of s and for any matching M : I → I × S,
Mi = s denotes that M(i) = (i, s). Let M be the set of
matchings. Define µ :M→ Z by
µ(M) =
∑
i∈I
(ϕi(Mi)− 1) .
For any given M ∈ M we will call µ(M) the preference
reverence index of M or simply the preference index.
For a given set of schools and students each equipped
with priorities and preferences respectively, if there exists
a matching M such that µ(M) = 0, we will say that
the students are preference compatible. If there exists no
such matching, the students are preference incompatible.
In §§?? we will refine this notion further.
Since M is finite, µ(M) is finite and hence there exists
some M ∈ M such that µ(M) ≤ µ(M ′) for all M ′ ∈
M. We will describe a method of seeking and locating such
a minimal index matching in §3. Here we focus on some
properties of our new index.
First we investigate how our index relates to the standard
notion of (Pareto) efficiency. Here is a useful lemma:
Lemma 2.1. Let M , M ′ : I → I × S be two matchings. If
M (Pareto) dominates M ′, then µ(M) < µ(M ′).
It clearly follows that our index is consistent with the
more standard notion of (Pareto) efficiency. However, the
index can also distinguish between two Pareto incompara-
bles, and thus provide a way to define different levels of ef-
ficiency. Consider for instance the following:
Example 2.2. Assume we have three students and three
schools, and each school has one spot. The student prefer-
ences over the schools are given as:
i1 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i2 : s3 ≻ s2 ≻ s1
i3 : s3 ≻ s1 ≻ s2
Here are two possible Pareto efficient matchings:
Pareto Efficient Matching #1 (µ = 1) :
(
i1 i2 i3
s1 s2 s3
)
Pareto Efficient Matching #2 (µ = 2) :
(
i1 i2 i3
s1 s3 s2
)
Both solutions are (Pareto) efficient because in each, there
is no way to make any of the students better off without mak-
ing another student worse off. However, they are (Pareto)
incomparable as moving from one to the other would nec-
essarily harm at least one student. When we compare the
two in terms of their preference indices, we see that one has
a lower index than the other, and hence in terms of the in-
dex, Matching 1 is preferable to Matching 2. In other words,
all Pareto efficient matchings are not made equal, and the
preference index provides a way in which we can differenti-
ate between (Pareto) efficient matchings. We can thus have
some basis by which to rate some “better” while rating oth-
ers “worse” provided that we are only given a list of ordinal
preferences.
Next we focus on our index and its relation to stability.
We begin with a result that follows from the above Lemma:
Corollary 1. Let M be a stable mechanism and let DA be
the deferred acceptance algorithm. Then for any preference
profile, µ(DA(P )) ≤ µ(M(P )).
There can exist two stable matchings with the same pref-
erence index. However, there is only one lowest preference
index stable matching:
Lemma 2.3. The SOSM matching is the unique lowest pref-
erence index stable matching for a given preference profile.
In other words the inequality in the above Corollary is strict.
The preference index measures how well ordinal prefer-
ences are being honored as a whole. Each time we move to
the next-best choice in a student’s ranking, this counts as “1
violation” of their preferences, and we then add up the num-
ber of times we make such violations. Thus, perhaps a more
apt title would be “preference dismissal index” since it is a
measure of how little the preferences are being “honored”
or “revered.” It should be noted that the preference index as-
sumes that it is the same to give one student their fifth choice
and one their first choice (Total=4) as it is to give two stu-
dents their third choice (Total=4).
3 A cost-minimizing school choice
mechanism
In §2 we defined a new notion, the preference index. We
then showed that previously proposed school choice mecha-
nisms do not perform optimally with respect to this criterion.
In this section we describe an alternative mechanism geared
specifically toward this notion. Our mechanism happens to
have several other desirable properties which we elaborate
on in the latter parts of this section.
The work in this section is built upon a combinato-
rial optimization algorithm known as the Hungarian al-
gorithm. The Hungarian algorithm is traditionally used to
find the minimum cost matching in various min-cost max-
flow problems such as assigning individuals to tasks or de-
termining minimum cost networks in travel (Kuhn 1955),
(Kuhn 1956). We note that the algorithm can be processed
in polynomial time (Munkres 1957), hence the mechanism
itself can effectively be implemented via a computer pro-
gram.
As the purpose of the Hungarian algorithm is to find the
minimum cost matching, the first step in adapting the algo-
rithm to the school choice problem is to define the cost of
any particular matching. But we already have a natural can-
didate. Indeed the preference reverence index defined in §2
proves to be a good indicator of the cost of a given match-
ing by measuring the cost in terms of the number and extent
of preference violations. Thus the resulting mechanism nat-
urally minimizes the preference reverence index.
Description
In the following we present an elementary description of the
Hungarian algorithm equivalent to the original development
in (Kuhn 1955). For a more sophisticated discussion includ-
ing computational complexity concerns and an exhaustive
investigation of the many variants of the method that lead to
impressive complexity improvements, see (Schrijver 2003,
Ch.17).
Let I and S be a set of students and schools, respectively,
and assume that a student preference profile P is given.
Suppose the students are preference incompatible. Since the
spaceM of all matchings is finite, µ(M) is finite and there-
fore there exists some M ∈ M such that µ(M) ≤ µ(M ′)
for all M ′ ∈M. We would like to find such a minimal index
matching. In order to do that we will define an associated
cost minimization problem.
Let A = (ajk) be the n × m matrix such that ajk =
ϕij (sk), encoding student preferences. Subtract 1 from each
of the entries to obtain a cost matrix C, a matrix with no
negative entries. For now assume that n = m, i.e., there is
an equal number of students and schools and each school has
a capacity of one. For example for the following preference
profile of three students for three schools:
i1 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i2 : s3 ≻ s2 ≻ s1
i3 : s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s1
the matrix A of preferences would be:
s1 s2 s3
i1 1 2 3
i2 3 2 1
i3 3 1 2
and the associated cost matrix would be:
C =
(
0 1 2
2 1 0
2 0 1
)
.
Now the assignment problem reduces to: Given a cost ma-
trix C, pick one element each from each row and each
column such that the sum of the selected entries is mini-
mal. The Hungarian algorithm will then run as follows (cf.
(Rorres and Anton 1984, Figure 6.1)):
1. Subtract the smallest entry in each row from each entry in
that row. [After this stage, all rows have at least one zero
entry, and all matrix entries are nonnegative.]
2. Subtract the smallest entry in each column from each en-
try in that column. [After this stage, all rows and columns
have at least one zero entry, and matrix entries are still
nonnegative.]
3. Draw lines through appropriate rows and columns so that
all the zero entries of the cost matrix are covered and the
minimum number of such lines is used. [There may be
several ways to do this, but the main point is that it can be
done.]
4. Test for optimality: If the number of covering lines is n,
then an optimal assignment of all zeroes is possible and
we are done; the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, such
an assignment is not yet possible, and we proceed to Step
5.
5. Determine the smallest entry not covered by any line, sub-
tract it from all uncovered entries and add it to all entries
covered by both a horizontal and a vertical line. Return to
Step 3.
Here is the outcome of the Hungarian algorithm for the pref-
erence profile above:
s1 s2 s3
i1 1 2 3
i2 3 2 1
i3 3 1 2
We note that Step 5 crucially depends on the following
Theorem 3.1 (Theorem 6.1 (Rorres and Anton 1984)). If a
number is added to or subtracted from all of the entries of
any row or column of a cost matrix, then an optimal (min-
imum cost) assignment for the resulting cost matrix is also
an optimal assignment for the original cost matrix.
Since the matching algorithm produces the least cost
matching (Munkres 1957), and our cost is represented by
the preference index, we see that the resultant matching has
the smallest preference index with respect to each student’s
preferences.
Proposition 3.2. Given a set of preferences, let M be the
matching produced by the Hungarian algorithm and let M ′
be any other matching. Then µ(M) ≤ µ(M ′).
A “Hungarian” school choice mechanism
In adapting the Hungarian algorithm to the school choice
problem, we must make three key modifications. The con-
struction of the algorithm as we presented it above requires
as input an n×n matrix of non-negative numbers, and it se-
lects as output a unique entry in each row and each column.
We must modify the algorithm to accommodate school ca-
pacities, unequal numbers of seats and students, as well as
preferences containing different numbers of ranked schools.
Assume columns represent schools and rows represent
students in our matrix. To express school capacities, we sim-
ply add an extra column for each available seat at a school
and enter the same preferences for that column.
The third modification addresses the problem of fami-
lies submitting incomplete preference profiles. It is not im-
mediately obvious why a district should request that stu-
dents submit lists of the same length. Furthermore, even if a
school district requires students to rank a specific number of
schools, there will undoubtedly be students who do not list
the required number. Regardless, in order to run the Hungar-
ian algorithm, it is necessary to devise a way of completing
student preferences such that each student preference list as-
signs a rank to each school or seat.
A potential solution is to use dummy variables to com-
plete any missing entries in the matrix. However, this
method may invite students to strategize. Even without com-
plete information, students might be motivated to strategize
by only submitting their first choice school, thereby weight-
ing this choice with dummy variables so that the algorithm
is more likely to select it.
Alternatively we can fill out the remainder of a student
preference profile with an equal ranking for all unranked
schools. More specifically if a student’s preference profile
contains only r ranks, then we assign the rank r + 1 to all
the remaining schools. This incentivizes the completion of
preference lists, since otherwise all remaining schools will
be treated equally. For instance, if a family puts only their
first choice, all other choices will be considered “second”;
therefore they may get a school which they consider terrible
at low cost as measured by the mechanism. Thus it would be-
hoove them to fill out as many schools as possible if they had
a genuine preference for one over another. This method does
not take into account priorities, but it does deflect strategiz-
ing. We offer it here as a simpler alternative.
Properties
Since the Index-Based Hungarian Mechanism (HMi) se-
lects the “least cost” matching, when we use preferences as
“costs” we have the following result:
Theorem 3.3. Given a preference profile P, for any mecha-
nismM
µ(HMi(P)) ≤ µ(M(P)).
The Index-Based Hungarian Mechanism meets our utili-
tarian standard of student optimal matchings. Furthermore,
it satisfies the standard notion of efficiency:
Corollary 2. Given a set of preferences P, let HMi(P)
be the matching produced by the Index-Based Hungarian
Mechanism. Then HMi(P) is (Pareto) efficient.
Next we briefly examine the performance of HMi with
respect to strategic action. Here our exposition is much
abridged; the reader is referred to our full research paper for
a complete strategy analysis.
We first assert:
Proposition 3.4. TheHMi, under complete information, is
not strategyproof.
The proof involves a concrete construction of a a prefer-
ence profile with which it is possible for a student to strate-
gize in order to improve her outcome. Thus under complete
information, the Index-Based Hungarian Mechanism is not
always immune to strategic action.
However, we are more interested in its performance under
incomplete information. In this latter situation, the question
is not whether it is possible for a student to receive a pre-
ferred school by lying, but whether any student has a ratio-
nal motive to falsify preferences. Our natural assumption is
that in the macro school choice environment, players are not
privy to everyone else’s preferences.
Unfortunately it turns out that there exist preference pro-
files in which one can strategize under incomplete informa-
tion in HMi. Thus our mechanism is not necessarily strate-
gyproof under incomplete information. ThusHMi is Pareto
efficient and minimizes the preference index, but it is NOT
strategyproof, even with the assumption of incomplete infor-
mation. (In the full paper we offer possible ways to make up
for this weakness.) It is also obviously not stable.
We observed earlier that the SOSM outcome is the mini-
mum preference index stable matching. Thus in our frame-
work, we can identify the SOSM outcome as the solution
to the school choice problem that minimizes the preference
index subject to the constraint of stability. Viewed this way,
theHMi outcome is the solution to the school choice prob-
lem that minimizes the preference index with no constraint.
Then, one may ask if making everyone best off relative to
each other is “worth” potentially high numbers of priority
violations. The cost of inefficiency imposed by stability has
been studied extensively in the literature, but the cost of in-
stability imposed by efficiency has been modeled and stud-
ied much less often (but also see (Tadenuma 2002) for a dis-
cussion of a similar trade-off between efficiency and equity).
We can offer a remedy to those who prefer fewer prior-
ity violations to more and who are willing to sacrifice some
efficiency. With respect to the preference index, we showed
that the HMi outcome is optimal. However, determining
the “next best matching” with respect to the preference in-
dex is paramount for a district wishing to minimize priority
violations. We can do so by listing assignments in order of
increasing preference index (cf. (Murty 1968)). Because the
SOSM outcome is the lowest preference index stable match-
ing, it will be the first stable matching found in this list.
Alternatively, one may start with the HMi
output and apply cycle improvements in the
spirit of (Erdil and Ergin 2008). Even though in
(Erdil and Ergin 2008) a stable cycle improvement is
only defined for stable starting points, it is possible to
develop a modification of the concept to include starting
situations which are unstable and aim toward a more stable
assignment. Further analysis of this is beyond the scope of
this note, but in such a scenario, each improvement would
correspond to a decrease in priority violations, and thus
produce a more stable matching. Counting the priority
violations, policy makers can determine what a particular
student’s priority is worth in terms of others’ preferences.
An important observation to make is that in basing our
mechanism on the preference index, we are merely attempt-
ing to refine a (rather coarse) partial order. This is not to
say that the HMi output will Pareto dominate matchings
obtained via all previous mechanisms. Certainly the HMi
will not Pareto dominate TTC, given that TTC is Pareto effi-
cient. Similarly, when the SOSM outcome is Pareto efficient,
HMi will not Pareto dominate it.
An implementation issue: multiple minima
We saw that the ordering induced by the preference in-
dex is not strict. Indeed a given preference profile might
have multiple minimum preference index solutions. The un-
derlying theoretical problem of finding all possible min-
imum cost assignments by the Hungarian algorithm was
addressed and answered in (Fukuda and Matsui 1992) (see
(Fukuda 1994) for an improvement on the main (polyno-
mial time) algorithm used in (Fukuda and Matsui 1992) and
(Manea and Ploscaru 2005) for more recent work in a simi-
lar vein). Thus it is possible to find all minimum preference
index solutions. This in turn raises a new question: How does
one choose among all these minimum preference index so-
lutions? We propose two possible approaches to deal with
this issue.
1. If one intends to promote fairness by narrowing the dis-
crepancies between the rankings of student assignments,
then the matching with the minimum variance across in-
dividual student preference indices should be chosen.
2. If one intends to choose “the most stable” matching, then
the matching with the fewest instances of priority viola-
tions should be chosen. Here, we look at the number of
students who had their priorities violated.
Of course, one may use both of these in succession.
This incidentally helps us resolve a possible concern
about the Hungarian algorithm: its dependence on the order
of the rows and the columns of the input matrix. Especially
when there are multiple minimal index solutions, the order
in which students or schools are listed may indeed affect the
outcome, and the output matching may be different in differ-
ent cases (though any two outcomes in such a scenario will
have the same index). However if we modify our mechanism
to look instead for all possible minimum cost matchings, this
no longer creates a problem. Thus, the order of the rows or
columns ultimately doesn’t matter because: (1) If there is a
unique cost minimizing solution, the order does not affect
the outcome; and (2) if there are multiple cost minimizing
solutions, we can find all of them using our mechanism, with
adaptations a la (Fukuda and Matsui 1992).
4 Conclusion
Current school choice mechanisms focus on balancing stu-
dent preferences and school priorities, and the resulting
matches sacrifice desirable characteristics. Since a good
public education is a scarce resource, there is no way to as-
sign students to schools in such a way that all students at-
tend top schools. Much of the controversy in school choice
concerns the ability of parents to send their children to their
school of choice. Thus in our approach we chose to focus on
student preferences. To this end, we developed a new crite-
rion, or measure, by which to evaluate the quality of a match-
ing that results from a school choice mechanism. The new
mechanism presented here was adapted from the well known
Hungarian algorithm (Kuhn 1955) which was developed as a
combinatorial solution to the assignment problem. Our mod-
ifications included a re-interpretation of assignments taking
into account school capacities and required that we be al-
lowed to “complete” submitted student preference profiles.
Our focus on student preferences over school priorities is
natural in the current climate in which the public debate over
charter schools and school vouchers rages in an attempt to
offer parents more control over their children’s educational
choices. The fact that stability often comes at a loss in effi-
ciency has been discussed at length in the School Choice
literature. However, there might be cases in which, if we
were to allow for simply one student with a violated pri-
ority, then we could make considerable efficiency gains (in
terms of lower preference index). Our method allows for
viewing “degrees of stability” (e.g. “highly stable” would
correspond to a “low number” of priority violations) in light
of efficiency gains (as determined by the preference index).
In cases where it is possible to achieve large efficiency gains
while remaining highly or semi-stable, it might be advan-
tageous to do so through our Hungarian Mechanism. Our
method should also appeal to families, since their prefer-
ences are taken into account “first.” As assignments shift in
an attempt to minimize preference violations and/or priority
violations, some balance might be reached.
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